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CHAPTER ONE
:
LOUISIANA JUVENILE JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS
Purpose of this Report
Louisiana faces an unprecedented opportunity to mobilize all
three branches of government to improve its youth corrections
system. The goal of this report is to help Louisiana continue to
take ' advantage of this opportunity through planning and
implementing effective responses to the problems of juvenile
delinquency.
This report, conducted with financial support from the Public
Welfare Foundation and through a contract with the Office of
Juvenile Services, is guided by NCCD's previous research and
-
experience in Utah, Massachusetts and Maryland. In these states,
juvenile corrections consists of a network of small secure programs
for the dangerous few, and a broad diversity of community-based
sanctions for most juvenile offenders. Key elements of this
approach include (1) decentralization of juvenile services , (2)
objective classification based on risks and needs, (3) continuous
case management and (4) extensive contracting with private sector
agencies that provide the bulk of placements and services. It is
NCCD's belief that Louisiana can, should, and will create a similar
system.
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Context of this Study
Louisiana already has made significant progress in juvenile
justice reform as reflected in a historical review excerpted from
the OJS's 1989 Report to the United States District Court.
A "justice" system for youth began emerging in
Louisiana in the early 1900's with the opening of
Louisiana Training Institute at Monroe in 1904, the State
Industrial School for Girl at Ball in 1928 and the State
Industrial School for Colored Youth in Baton Rouge in
1936. Generally, the majority of youth committed to the
schools were what we refer to today as in-need-of-care
and in-need-of-supervision children. Youth who committed
serious offenses, referred to as delinquent today, were
sentenced to jails and prisons through the late 1940's.
During the 1940's and 1950's, professionals across
the country, as well as throughout Louisiana, began
calling for the removal of the in-need-of-care child and
the emotionally disturbed or mentally retarded child from
these institutions. During these years the schools began
receiving more and more youth who actually needed
behavior "correcting" requiring treatment and
rehabilitation rather than merely "training" for
adulthood.
The call was to go unheeded for nearly three decades
as the institutions overflowed with youth ranging from
the abandoned child, to the truant or runaway, to the
arsonist and murderer. During the 1960' s, the population
of what is now LTI-East Baton Rouge alone rose to 1,500.
Throughout the schools, youth were sleeping on floors, in
hallways, in closets or under the bed of another.
These same professionals also began looking for
avenues to remedy the fragmentation of services for youth
such as probation, parole, training schools and other
programs which were spread among several State and local
agencies.
During the 1960's community group homes began to
develop across the State and were part of the Department
of Public Welfare as was juvenile probation and parole.
The training schools had been merged into the Department
of Institutions. The bringing of the three major
providers of services for youth under the same umbrella
would take another 25 years.
During these years, the placement of youth was
basically determined by the judiciary as they determined
which agency the youth would be committed to. The
courts' ability to commit to a specific institution was
lost when the Department of Corrections, in 1970, opened
the Juvenile Reception and Diagnostic Center for the
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tpurpose of determining the needs of youth committed to
its care and the institution that could best address
those needs.
In 1975, Louisiana became a signatory to the federal
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, pledging
to remove status offenders from the training schools.
However, the populations did not significantly decrease
as judges with juvenile jurisdiction, using the violation
of a valid court order offense, simply began adjudicating
youth as delinquent rather than as status offenders and
committed them to the custody of the Department of
Corrections which operated on the training schools.
The Federal Court initially intervened in the early
1980's to cap the rising numbers at the State's training
schools using health and fire standards. As the
judiciary determined placement by determining the agency
of commitment, this cap was only partially effective.
The pressure to crowd more children into the already
overcrowded, inadequately staffed and deteriorating
physical plants continued.
In 1984, the United States District Court, Middle
District of Louisiana, signed a Consent Decree with the
State capping the juvenile institutional populations at
850 based on (1) fire and safety standards; (2) minimum
staffing requirements for effective treatment and
rehabilitation; and, (3) safety of the offenders, staff
and public. The training school population became
strictly tied to the State government's ability and
willingness to pay for adequate staff and related
services.
Also in 1984, the Legislature agreed that
fragmentation of services must end. On January 1, 1985,
the Division of Youth Services, responsible for juvenile
probation, parole and placement ( in group homes ), was
transferred to the Office of Juvenile Services. The
judiciary continued its tradition of determining the
placement needs of youth by issuing orders such as
"...committed to the Department of Public Safety and
111Corrections for placement in...
With the assistance of NCCD, the Office of Juvenile Services
developed a classification system to determine the needs of each
youth committed to its care as well as the risk that child presents
to himself and the public.
1 Report to the United States District Court, Middle District
of Louisiana, October 1989, prepared by the Office of Juvenile
Services.
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The Office of Juvenile Services began to redesign
institutional and community residential programs to
provide specific services for specific populations.
Between 1984 and 1989, alternative program redesign or
development included independent living programs,
professional home care, non-residential day treatment,
electronic monitoring, family preservation, volunteer
mentoring programs, a wilderness program, and the STOP
program at LTI-Bridge City.
The 1987 Legislature agreed that to ensure a youth
was placed in an appropriate program that would serve his
or her individual needs and the youth would have the
ability to move to . a less restrictive ( and less
expensive ) program in a timely manner, the Office of
Juvenile Services needed to have sole authority for
placement of, programming for and services for youth
placed in its custody by the judiciary.
Yet, in September of 1988, a technical assistance
consultant wrote, "The (OJS) is empowered to place youth
in lesser restrictive settings... but judicial
expectation minimizes these placements and requires that
diversion be handled with great discretion. The judicial
expectation has created a system that is overcrowded. . . "2
The Office of Juvenile Services worked consistently to improve
conditions in the LTIs and to create a significant network of
community-based programs. These efforts resulted in a 25 percent
decline in admissions to the LTIs. However, progress toward a
system of community-based care slowed as Louisiana faced a severe
fiscal crisis due to recessions in key industries such as oil,
natural gas and agriculture. State agencies, including OJS, faced
major cutbacks in their budgets. Concurrently, the national
concern over drug abuse impacted Louisiana's juvenile justice
system. Juvenile arrests increased, as did demands for harsher
punishments for youthful drug dealers.
2 Report to the United States District Court, Middle District
of Louisiana, October 1989, prepared by the Office of Juvenile
Services.
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In most states, the "get tough" movement and fiscal
constraints have led to serious overcrowding in juvenile
correctional facilities. However, the Federal Court Consent
Decree governing the population of the LTIs prevented dangerous
overcrowding from occurring. A negative consequence of the cap was
a backlog of youths awaiting secure care evaluation. These youths
are either residing at home, or more likely, are confined in local
detention centers. These local facilities have few educational and
treatment resources; they are designed for short-term confinement
only. For most of 1989-1990 there were 200-250 youths on a backlog
status.
The backlog has frustrated local officials and led United
States District Court Judge Frank J. Polozola to require 0JS to
propose a remedy for the situation. On October 16, 1989, the
Office of Juvenile Services presented its plan to the Court. The
Court has accepted the plan as part of the legally binding Consent
Decree.
Although OJS's plan stressed the need for a comprehensive and
long-term solution to juvenile corrections problems, the short-term
steps were significant. The state agreed to retain a nationally
respected research and consulting group to develop a long-term plan
to meet the secure care needs of Louisiana's troubled youth.
Louisiana agreed to immediately invest $2.5 million in the
expansion of community-based placements. In fiscal year 1991-1992,
the 0JS budget will provide for a 33 percent increase in community-
based placements. Louisiana proposed also to renovate and add
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staffing to existing LTI's to increase the bed capacity by 10
percent. This will result in a system containing 940 secure beds
and 955 community placements. The 0JS also is pilot testing a
program designed to shorten lengths of stay in the LTIs by
accelerating planning for aftercare services.
In February 1990, Assistant Secretary Don Wydra wrote NCCD
"requesting assistance in our continuing process of strategic
planning for the future of Louisiana' s juvenile justice programs. . .
( The OJS ) made a commitment to diversification of services in
1984... We have maintained this commitment and slowly implemented
program diversification even during the years of... a poor economic
climate... Your assistance would be an asset to use in such areas
as examining the need for secure beds in the future; assessing the
need for additional diversification of alternative programs;
reviewing our secure screening document as it relates to public
safety risk; making recommendations regarding the length of stay in
both institutional and community-based programs."
The NCCD agreed to assist the OJS, and received partial
support for this effort from the Public Welfare Foundation, which
has a longstanding commitment to improving the care of at-risk
children and adolescents nationwide.
Plan of the Report
The next chapter of this report presents a forecast of
Louisiana's secure care bed needs for juvenile offenders for the
next five years ( 1990-1995). The chapter profiles the existing LTI
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population and examines the potential impact of various policy
scenarios on the need for secure beds.
Chapter Three looks at youth in backlog status, those entering
the LTIs, and those placed in community programs. Based on the
classification study of a random sample of 515 youths committed to
OJS, NCCD computed the need for secure beds using a proposed
objective, public-safety oriented classification instrument. The
instrument was designed by a group of juvenile justice
professionals from throughout Louisiana as part of this project.
The instrument is fully described later in this report.
Chapters Four and Five examine a sampling of current
community-based programs, and discuss 0JS policies relevant to
improved placement and case management decisions.
Finally, in Chapter Six, NCCD summarizes the policy choices
available to Louisiana and recommends the critical next steps OJS
must take to continue improving the quality of care it provides.
As the title of this report suggests, Louisiana is truly at
the crossroads in its juvenile justice reform efforts. One road
leads to continued supervision by the Federal Court and repeated
short-term fixes to system-wide problems. The other road leads to
a new paradigm of juvenile justice that promises to advance both
public safety and "the best interests of the child".
§
CHAPTER TWO
FORECASTING THE NEED FOR SECURE CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS
Analysis of Current Population Trends
In this section, NCCD examines current population trends and
develops a series of forecasts for the five-year secure bed needs
of OJS. These forecasts are extremely sensitive to policy
decisions with alternative policy scenarios producing a broad range
of potential secure bed needs.
To begin this analysis, it is useful to examine recent trends
in the LTI population. At the end of FY 1990, there were 850 youth
confined in the LTIs and an additional 220 held in various
detention facilities awaiting secure care evaluation. These
figures have remained fairly constant over the past 12 months. Of
the 850 juveniles in the LTIs, the vast majority ( 95 percent ) were
male and 81 percent were minority, predominately African-Americans.
The commitment rate to LTI for minority youths is over four times
that of white adolescents.
Figure 1 shows the most serious charge for which these youths
were committed to OJS. The largest offense group was burglary.
Violent and sex offenders compose 36 percent of the LTI residents;
serious property offenders account for another 37 percent, and drug
offenders make up 9 percent of the LTI group.
Over the last decade, the LTI population remained relatively
stable at roughly 1,000 youth. However, following the Consent
Decree in 1984, Louisiana experienced a steady growth in the number
of youth held in detention awaiting secure evaluation.
Distribution of Most Serious Offenses
Of LTI Confined Population
Burglary
30%Robbery
17%
'4•
F
Assault
10%
Other
Sex Crime 18%
6%
Drugs
9% Theft
Homocide
3%
7%
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Approximately 690 youths were admitted to Louisiana's secure
care system in FY 1989-1990. The average sentence for these
admissions was 45.5 months. However, youth released from the LTIs
in the same fiscal year with sentences of 37-48 months actually
served an average of 11.3 months. The lengthy sentences probably
reflect the prevailing judicial practice of sentencing youths to
0JS until the age of majority ( 21 years old ). The 11.3 months of
time served is a more accurate reflection of the local "tariff of
punishment" for serious juvenile offenders. Based on national data
analyzed by NCCD, Louisiana's length of stay is slightly above the
national average for training schools.
Upon admission to LTIs, 24 percent of youths are classified as
requiring maximum custody, 51 percent are classified as medium
custody and 25 percent are considered minimum custody. This
initial classification is heavily determined by the severity of the
commitment offense as well as the youth's prior juvenile court
involvement and escape history. Custody classification determines
the assignment of a youth to various LTIs and, to some extent, his
placement in living units within each facility.
0JS employs a four-level offense severity scale to categorize
offenses. The "Highest" group consists of violent crimes and the
"High" group includes aggravated assaults, burglary and drug
offenses. Simple assault and most property crimes are classified
as "Moderate" in severity. The "Low" category includes petty theft
and status offenses.
I
10
I:
:
"
If one collapses the two most serious offense categories and
combines the "Low" and "Moderate" groups, the following analysis is
revealed ( Figure 2 ). This analysis shows the breakdown of FY 1989-
1990 admission by gender, severity of offense and custody
classification level. Over half ( 54 percent ) of the LTI admissions
were in the less serious offense groups and most were classified as
requiring medium or minimum custody. Similarly, with the more
serious offenders, two-thirds were classified by 0JS as needing
minimum or medium custody.
Estimating Future Secure Bed Needs
NCCD used a computer simulation model to project the secure
care population through FY 1995. This model incorporates data on
demographic changes in the youth population, juvenile arrest
trends, commitment rate analyzed by offense, age, gender and race,
and average time served for various offense groupings.3 This
projection includes youths in detention who would be in an LTI or
in the JRDC if bed space were available.
To make the ihitial or baseline projection, NCCD gathered data
on the expected growth in the youth population from the Louisiana
3 The NCCD forecasting model is more fully described in Jones,
Michael and Aaron McVey, NCCD Prophet Simulation Model: an
Interactive Microcomputer Simulation System, San Francisco, CA:
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 1990.
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Department of Education.4 The baseline projection assumes future
intakes are identical to the FY 1989-1990 admissions in terms of
age, gender, race, and offense types. The baseline forecast also
assumes that lengths of stay remain relatively constant. This
forecast shows the path that 0JS is following under present
juvenile justice laws and policies.
At the end of FY 1989-1990, 1,070 juveniles were in secure
beds or awaiting secure care evaluation. Assuming that current
judicial sentencing and release policies and practices remain
unchanged, the NCCD forecasting model projects this population to
decline slightly during the latter part of FY 1990-1991.
Thereafter, the LTI population will rise moderately through FY 1995
( Figure 3 ). The total project growth is 80 youths or roughly 7.5
percent of the current secure care population.
This moderate growth in the secure care population is produced
by (1) a slight increase in admissions, albeit a slower growth rate
than in recent years and (2) the initiation of the STOP program and
other 0JS programs and policies aimed at reducing lengths of stay
for non-serious offenders.
Assuming no further changes by juvenile justice practitioners
at all governmental levels and in all branches of government,
Louisiana will need to expand its secure bed inventory by
4 NCCD used population data from the Louisiana Department of
Education because these data appeared more accurate than estimates
available from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. If Census Bureau
figures are used, the Louisiana youth population is expected to
decline .significantly. The Department of Education statistics
forecast a more stable youth population through 1995.
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approximately 300 beds to meet this need and to eliminate the
detention backlog. The estimated cost of building these additional
beds is almost $33 million.
The baseline projected need for secure beds, assuming no
statutory, policy or practice changes, is 1,105 beds for males and
45 beds for females. Almost half of the beds ( 49 percent ) would
house offenders classified as medium custody. Another 26 percent
would be maximum custody, and 25 percent would confine minimum
custody offenders.
It is crucial to remember that this baseline forecast is
dependent upon policy choices. If 0JS diverts into community
programs all minimum custody youths and those medium custody
offenders charged with minor offenses, the secure bed needs in FY
1995 would drop to 509 beds. Alternatively, if 0JS reduced the
average time served in LTIs by three months, the required secure
'
care bed needs in FY 1995 would be 873.
The Impact of Selected Policy Changes on OJS Secure Bed Needs
In a series of meetings held in early 1991, 0JS top managers
developed six policy options directed at reducing future secure
bedspace requirements. Using the NCCD baseline forecast, each of
the options was reviewed as to its probable affect on the secure
care population over the next five years. The policy options are
listed below:
1. Divert the lowest severity offenders from secure care.
2. Limit the secure confinement of drug offenders to 12
months.
"3. Parole all property offenders 6-9 months prior to the
expiration of their sentences.
4. Reassign all offenders to community placements 6-9 months
prior to their maximum sentences.
5. Make the maximum sentence up to age 18 for all but the
highest severity offenses.
6. Reassign to non-secure programs those offenders who are
within 15 days of their classification as minimum-out.
The first two options save very few secure beds. The early
release of property offenders could save as many as 72 beds.
Option four broadens the early release groups and could save 94
beds. Setting age 18 as the minimum sentence for all but the most
serious offenders would save 138 beds. The last option would save
122-191 beds.
Many of these options would impact overlapping offender
groups. NCCD attempted to estimate the cumulative impact if OJS
implemented all of the options ( some require statutory
authorization). The total secure bed savings would be 300-369
beds. Interestingly, this total impact is roughly equal to the
forecasted need for new secure beds as noted in NCCD's baseline
forecast. Put simply, 0JS could avoid the need for costly new
construction of additional LTI beds by implementing these modest
program and policy moves.
In the next chapter, NCCD looks at the custody needs of
current clients in greater detail. The analysis suggests OJS, by
implementing some of the earlier options and expanding and
enhancing its community-based care system, could safely phase out
16
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some of its existing secure care beds and still provide secure care
for high risk offenders.
CHAPTER THREE
SECURITY NEEDS OF LOUISIANA'S JUVENILE OFFENDERS
In this chapter, NCCD examines the secure bed impact of a more
community-based approach to juvenile offender treatment and
rehabilitation.
States as diverse as Massachusetts, Utah and Missouri have
converted their juvenile correctibnal systems to a true community-
based model. In each of these states, the dangerous few are
managed in small, secure, staff-intensive facilities, typically no
more than 30 beds each. The balance of offenders are supervised in
a continuum of placements including staff secure facilities,
specialized group homes, day treatment programs and intensive
supervision programs. Research has shown that the community-based
systems are more cost-effective and protect public safety better
than traditional approaches.5
Each of the community-based states employs standardized
classification systems to identify those youths who require secure
confinement. To complete the analysis of the Louisiana juvenile
offender population, NCCD worked with a small task force of
juvenile justice officials to develop an objective classification
(or risk screening) instrument. The task force included
representatives of the judiciary, law enforcement and OJS
5 Krisberg, Barry, James Austin and Patricia A. Steele,
Unlocking Juvenile Corrections: Evaluating the Massachusetts
Department of Youth Services, NCCD, San Francisco, 1989 and Austin,
James, Karen Joe, Barry Krisberg and Patricia A. Steele, The Impact
of Juvenile Court Sanctions: A Court that Works, NCCD, San
Francisco, 1990.
:management staff. The screening tool they agreed upon is presented
as Exhibit 1.
The Louisiana screening instrument is properly focused on
public safety considerations. The severity of the current offense
as well as the extent of the youth's delinquent history are heavily
weighted. In addition, the screening document considers the
youth's behavior in prior in-home and placement settings.
Youths scoring 6 or fewer points are assumed to be eligible
for community placement; those with scores of 7 or 8 are assumed to
be candidates for a 90-day secure program, followed by community
placement. Youths scoring 9 points or above are designated as
secure care cases.
This instrument was applied to (1) all youths in backlog
status and (2) a random sample of youths entering LTIs and non-
secure placements over the previous eight months. In all, 515
cases were coded by 0JS staff using the NCCD classification
instrument. The coders were permitted to "override" the score if
they believed the points did not match the actual risk level
presented by the youth. Very few cases resulted in overrides,
suggesting the staff felt comfortable with the validity of the risk
scores.
Figure 4 summarizes the data for the backlog population. The
classification instrument placed 23 percent of the backlog youths
in secure beds. Another 13 percent of these youths scored for the
short-term secure program. The vast majority, 64 percent of the
backlog population, was classified for non-secure placement.
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EXHIBIT 1
:
Offender:
Present Adjudicated Offense:
OFFICE OF JUVENILE SERVICES
SECURE CUSTODY SCREENING DOCUMENT
RECORD OF OFFENSES
1 Severity of Present Adjudicated Offense
Level "0" Felony --- (10)
Level "1• Felony --- C 7 )
Level "2" Felony --- C 5 )
DOB:
2 If present adjudication involves: ()
Possession/Use of Firearm -- ADD (2) ·
Multiple Felonies -- ADD (2)
JIRMS NO.
Date of Disposition:
Level "3" Felony --
Level "4' Felony --
Any Other Offense --
3 Number of Prior Adjudications ( )
Two or More Felony Adjudications -- (2)
One Felony or Two or More Misdemeanors -- (1)
None--(0 )
4 Most Serious Prior Adjudication ()
Level "0" or Level "1" Felony -- (5)
Level "2" Felony -- (3)
Level "3" or below -- (0)
5 FOR OFFENDERS WITH PRIOR ADJUDICATIONS
Age at First Adjudication:
Age 13 or younger -- (2)
Age 14 up to 15 -- (1)
Age 15 and older -- (0)
RECORD OF INTERVENTION
6 History of Probation/Parole Supervision ()
Offender Currently on Probation/Parole -- (2)
Offender With Probation/Parole Revocation -- ( 1 )
None -- (0)
7 History of In-Home/Non-Secure Residential Intervention
Three or more prior failure -- (3)
One or Two prior failures -- (1)
None -- (0)
8 If the Offender had a Prior Secure Placement in OJS ( )
ADD -- (2)
9 Prior Escapes or Runaways ( 1
From Secure Facility More than Once -- (3)
From Secure Facility Once -- (2)
From Non-Secure Facility Two or More Times -- (2)
From Non-Secure Facility Once -- (1)
Nohe--(01
RECOMMENDED ACTION:
If Total Score is 0-6, consider non-secure placement.
If Total Score is 7-8, consider short-term secure placement.
If Total Score is 9 or above, consider secure placement.
- ( 31
- ( 11
- ( 01
SCORE
SCORE
TOTAL SCORE ( Items 1 - 9 ):
C )
()
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144 (64%)
140
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CUSTODY RECOMMENDATION
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• SECURE
Based on a Random Snmple of OJS Youth
"NCCD then applied the classification instrument to a random
sample of youths who went through the Juvenile Reception and
Diagnostic Center (JRDC) and were subsequently placed in community
programs. Figure 5 summarized the classification scores for these
youths. This analysis suggests that current 0JS community
placements are consistent with public safety considerations. The
vast majority of community placements ( 72 percent ) scored less than
six points on the NCCD classification instrument. Approximately 17
percent were classified as eligible for a short-term secure
placement. However, 11 percent of those youths placed in the
community scored high enough to be considered for secure care. A
closer analysis of this latter group might reveal mitigating
factors that led OJS staff to "override" the classification
decision. This would not be uncommon. In Massachusetts, roughly
25 percent of those youth eligible for secure confinement are
actually placed in community-based programs based on the clinical
judgements of a departmental classification team.
Finally, and most interestingly, when NCCD scored a random
sample of a nine-month period's worth of admissions to the LTIs,
only 46 percent of this group was classified as needing secure
care. Another 19 percent scored for short-term secure care.
Thirty-five percent scored for community placement ( Figure 6 ).
This suggests that based on objective, public safety criteria, many
youths in secure care beds could be better served in short-term
secure or community programs.
22
NON-SECURE POPULATION
CUSTODY RECOMMENDATION
NUMBER OF YOUTH
120
106 (72%)
100 T
80 1
60
i
40 in
26 ( 17%)
16 ( 11%)
20
0
CUSTODY RECOMMENDATION
• NON-SECURE • .• 1 SHORT TERM • SECURE
Based on a Random Sample of OJS Youth
LTI POPULATION
CUSTODY RECOMMENDATION
NUMBER OF YOUTH
70 -
65(46%)
60
50 (3596)
50
40
"1
27 ( 19%)
1 30 li-..
01
20
10
0- 1
CUSTODY RECOMMENDATION
f• NON-SECURE • SHORT TERM • SECURE
Based on a Random Sample of OJS Youth
1
§I
:
The impact on the 0JS secure bed needs can be seen in
Figure 7. This figure documents the recommended versus the actual
placement of the sample of youths who were placed in JRDC. At
present, 49 percent of these offenders are placed in an LTI, but
the NCCD classification instrument recommends only 28 percent for
long-term LTI placement.
This analysis is further refined in Figure 8. If one assumes
that 690 youths per year will enter JRDC and that there are 220
youths awaiting secure care evaluation, then revised secure care
bed needs can be computed based on the results of the NCCD
classification study. NCCD's findings suggest that 0JS receives
367 youths per year requiring long-term secure confinement; 159
needing short-term secure care and 384 requiring community
placement. If one assumes a 12 month stay for secure cases, 3
months for short-term and one month for community placement, the
annual need for secure care beds is 439. This is almost half the
current population of the LTIs.
To be prudent, Louisiana may wish to operate up to 500 beds to
account for slightly longer terms for very serious offenders. Use
of the NCCD classification instrument to determine secure care
placement based on objective, public safety standards can be
expected to have significant impact on the costs of secure care for
the State. Monies saved by closing existing LTIs could be re-
programmed to "front end" preventive programs as well as to
improved secure care facilities, programming, and aftercare
services. Prevention and aftercare service strategies have
"
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FIGURE 8
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I
Secure
Short-term
Non-secure
LOUISIANA FORECASTED SECURE BED NEEDS*
LTI Admits
316
131
243
Bed Needs
Custodv Level # of youths
Secure 367
Short-term Secure 159
Community Beds 384
Waiting List
51
28
141
ExDected LOS
x 12 mos.
x 3 mos.
x 1 mos.
Total
367
159
384
# of Annualized Beds
367
40
_32
439
* Assumes 690 admissions per year and 220 youths in backlog status.
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repeatedly demonstrated their high payoffs in terms of reduced
youth crime.6
6 Krisberg, Barry, James Austin and Patricia A. Steele,
Unlockinq Juvenile Corrections: Evaluating the Massachusetts
Department of Youth Services, NCCD, San Francisco, 1989.
CHAPTER FOUR
COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAM ISSUES IN LOUISIANA
This chapter examines community-based programming in
Louisiana. Data were collected during visits to 11 community
programs throughout the state. Programs were observed in
operation, and administrators, staff and clients were interviewed
in depth. Follow-up discussions were conducted with some program
administrators, as were conversations with some OJS Evaluation and
Placement staff.
The majority of programs NCCD visited are adequately funded
and run competently by enthusiastic, dedicated staff. Several of
the programs are outstanding, and the recommendations which follow
seek to build upon these programmatic strengths.
The Need for a Continuum of Care
A complete juvenile justice system should consist of a
spectrum of placement options, with secure care at the high end,
probation at the low end, and an array of community placements,
both residential and non-residential, in the middle. Louisiana has
made great progress in the past six years in developing a complete
continuum of care. Notably, a broad diversification of program
options has been created over the past several years.
A significant portion of the OJS's recommendations to the
Federal Court concerned the redesign or development of this middle
area of community-based programs. During the past calendar year,
following the acceptance of the report by the Court, the 0JS has
icontracted for halfway houses for males and females, staff secure
group homes for males and females, expansion of professional home
care and family preservation services programs, and several other
programs for specific populations of clients. Louisiana chose to
develop this diversity of programs slowly over a two to three year
period.
Many of these community-based program contracts went to new
groups who came forward willing to participate on a partnership
basis with the Office of Juvenile Services in its efforts to reform
Louisiana's juvenile justice system. The single largest obstacle
to getting these programs open was local zoning ordinances and the
"not in my back yard" mindset of the public.
Having made significant progress toward its initial objective
of establishing a broader diversity of community programs,
Louisiana Office of Juvenile Services now faces the challenge of
linking these programs together to create a more unified continuum
of care. Many of the community-based programs function far too
autonomously. They design their own schedules, counseling programs
and level or behavior management systems. Unfortunately, some
administrators and staff are unaware of their program's particular
strengths and weaknesses in comparison with similar programs. The
private sector providers appear to lack a.sense of cohesiveness
among themselves as a community of providers. Finally, several of
the programs visited lack an understanding of the specific role
they might play in the larger objective of serving 0JS clients.
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In order to maximize the effectiveness of community
programming, the OJS should increase its efforts to develop private
sector linkage on a regional basis. In addition, further efforts
must be made to educate all parties in a region to the presenting
problems, difficulties and existing service options available to
0JS clients. In this manner, community programming can live up to
its full potential in Louisiana.
Community programs play an intermediary role in a juvenile
correctional system. These programs should not be viewed merely as
alternatives to placement in a secure institutional setting. They
should, rather, be viewed as specific rehabilitative options for
specific types of clients. Louisiana's community-based programs
have not yet become fully aware of their role. The OJS must'
continue to delineate and define these functions.
The Policy and Procedures Manual for OJS, Division of
Evaluation and Placement, effective September 1, 1988, reads as
follows:
". . .offenders in the custody of DPSC whose classif ication
and assessment indicate a need for treatment services in
a non-secure custody setting shall be referred for
placement at treatment facilities and programs
appropriate to the 'level of care indicated. "7
The level of care indicated, it continues,
"... will be... the least restrictive Snvironment
available and appropriate to address offenders needs and
risks as determined by a case staffing."
7 Office of Juvenile Services, Division of Evaluation and
Placement, Policy and Procedures Manual, page 4, 1988.
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IThe wording of this second directive is acceptably vague. It
allows the staff sufficient latitude in deciding what sort of
treatment each youth requires. The first directive, however, is
too ·vague. Because the term "appropriate" is undefined, staff do
not have sufficient criteria for determining when a facility is or
is not appropriate for a youth.
There are, of course, several manners in which to define the
specific role of a given facility and provide additional placement
criteria or guidelines. One method to be considered would be to
rank or classify each community program in terms of client control
and/or specific treatment methodologies. This particular method
would, at least, provide some specific criteria for placement of
youth into any given program. While these criteria would be based
solely upon levels of client control or specific treatment methods,
it is one manner in which the state's community programs would be
delineated in a continuum of care. Once again, the 0JS must now
meet the challenge of closely linking these programs.
The absence of program linkage has allowed the private
providers too much autonomy. As a result, the objective of the
state to assign a youth to a proper treatment program is hampered.
By selecting a method of classifying and linking program
interventions, the 0JS will have greater freedom in determining the
boundaries and time frames in which community care will be
delivered.
Finally, by providing a "program classification" system, the
0JS will be able to assist the community-based programs to enhance
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their specific treatment objectives through a reallocation of
resources. For example, a particular program in north Louisiana
has a significant number of youth with "gang affiliations." This
program could, perhaps, be classified with gang memberships as a
formal criteria for acceptance. The 0JS could then develop
specific staff development activities and program enhancements that
would increase the program's overall effectiveness in dealing with
gang members. In addition, 0JS statewide would know that gang
members could be referred to the program.
Recommendations:
The state can better direct its community programs through
several measures.
1. In the coming months, the state should begin to clearly
define its role as a procurer and purchaser of services.
New emphasis should be placed on developing specific
contractual agreements between the state and private
providers, in which program services and target
populations are strictly defined. Only in such a system
will the balance of power between the state and providers
be healthy and equal, with both sides accountable and
responsible to each other.
2. 0JS should create a "continuum of care" model. For
example, by studying a sample of admissions to community
programs, OJS can determine the number of remedial
education placements, the number of drug counseling
placements, the number of gang rehabilitation placements,
etc., that are needed. Custody requirements should also
\
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be considered. These findings will indicate what a
continuum of care must contain.
3. The 0JS should evaluate and classify ( according to
treatment and public safety criteria ) all of its existing
programs. It can start the process by having programs
fill out extensive surveys in which the programs define
their missions, their target populations, and their
potential to expand their services. These responses
should be critically reviewed by 0JS management, which
should then gather its own information about the
programs. Eventually, programs should be classified by
treatment and level of supervision criteria.
Once programs have been fully evaluated, a "Program
Resource Manual" should be created that will act as an
educational tool for state and provider staff. It should
entail a description of every program, its
classification, length of stay, target populations,
geographic location, treatment modalities, as well as its
unique characteristics.
4. By matching up the spectrum of existing programs with the
ideal continuum of care, 0JS can determine where the gaps
in its non-secure programming exist, and can pursue the
procurement of services to fill those gaps.
5. The OJS should create a "Roving Assistance Team" that
will monitor programs in-depth and full-time. The Team' s
role would not be that of an enforcer, or a policing
agent, but rather that of a trouble-spotter and
information-gatherer. Teams of two people should spend
a full week, twice a year, at each program. The extended
period of stay will allow the programs' most subtle
strengths and weaknesses to be observed; proper
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evaluation is difficult during a one-day visit. The
establishment of a Roving Assistance Team will guarantee
0JS a supply of constantly updated information with which
to ensure that the theoretical continuum of care was
being fulfilled in practice. It will also serve a more
general purpose. Through exposure to a wide range of
programs, the teams would be able to sense system-wide
trends that would otherwise go unnoticed. Such trends
might include an increase in violent behavior by youth,
the popularity of a new type of drug, increasing sexual
acting out, or programmatic confusion about how to deal
with gang members. An additional role the Roving
Assessment Team could serve would be to improve programs
through casual and formal suggestions given at the close
of each visit.
Follow-up and Aftercare
The absence of a sufficiently coordinated aftercare system
limits the positive impact of Louisiana's community programs. This
lack of coordination has two aspects. First, youths are not
adequately tracked after being released from community programs.
Program heads have no formal mechanism through which to find out
how their former clients fare after release. Second, there are few
programs, such as community living, mentoring, and job counseling,
that are widely available to releasees. The unfortunate result is
that most programs release their clients with little hope of being
able to monitor their progress or to assist them if necessary.
A second problem involves aftercare itself. When asked what
programs are available to releasees, community program directors
often responded that while a few youths might be placed in
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community living, for the most part, youths are released outright.
This is disturbing, they said, because many youths request
aftercare. This situation could be avoided if more aftercare
options were available.
Recommendations:
1. A follow-up system should be considered by the state, in
which 0JS case managers are responsible for monitoring
each released youth ( by telephone or through visits )
every three months for at least one year following
discharge. Youths' progress should be tracked, in terms
of rearrest, readjudication, employment, training,
education, and counseling. The results should be
tabulated, with copies going to the regional office and
to 0JS headquarters. This will enable programs and
headquarters to monitor their success rate. These data
will also provide a valuable avenue of feedback that
programs can use to modify their services, and 0JS can
use to pinpoint areas in need of improvement.
2. More aftercare programs should be created. This will be
the more difficult of the tQo recommendations to fulfill,
and will require feasibility studies, to determine both
cost and logistical information. However, a long-term
goal of 0JS must be to institute a vibrant aftercare
system. Without one, the efforts of dedicated staff at
many community programs will go wasted.
Counseling
Counseling quality varied widely in the eleven programs
visited. In some, counseling is excellent, occurs daily, and is
1'
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found to be meaningful by participants and staff. In others,
counseling exists in name only; counselors are uninspired or
dispirited, youth do not take counseling seriously, and attempts at
counseling occur infrequently. Further, there are no clear
qualification requirements for counseling positions at the various
programs. Few programs have trained psychologists or psychiatrists
on staff, although many program directors would very much like to
have access to such expertise. The lack of advanced training on
the part of most counselors makes it crucial that there be strict
minimum counseling standards and programs set forth by the state.
Recommendations:
1. Programs might be ranked by the state according to the
intensity and quality of counseling. Ranking would
include a consideration of counselor credentials, access
to psychiatrists, frequency of individual and group
counseling, analysis of anonymous evaluations of
counseling completed by client youth and by other staff,
and the severity of behavioral problems at the
institution. This information will be used in the
"Program Resource Manual."
2. The state should set minimum goals and expectations for
counseling at each program. The state should outline a
basic range of counseling services that they would like
programs to offer ( frequency and duration of group and
individual counseling, victims of sexual and physical
abuse counseling, drug and alcohol addiction counseling) .
However, the provider community should be challenged to
formulate their own set of standards. Programs should
have some latitude as to how those counseling sessions
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occur. This approach to the problem will allow a diverse
array of counseling programs to develop in the provider
community, from which placement personnel can choose,
while at the same time ensuring that all programs meet
minimum standards.
3. It is unlikely that the provider community will ever be
in a position to hire only Masters level social workers.
As such, many counselors statewide will have had only a
college education, and will therefore not have had as
much training as they need. As such, the state might
consider exploring ways to provide ongoing education for
counselors. Funding might be provided for counselors to
take continuing education courses at community colleges,
or for State-sponsored seminars or retreats to be offered
to all interested counselors, in which outside experts
would offer lectures on specific problems and the
counseling community would discuss among itself issues
which affect juvenile justice counseling.
Control Over Education
A major emerging issue for community-based juvenile programs
is the lack of control they have over the quality of education
provided to their residents. Two types of education are used by
community programs. Some send their youth to the local public
school. Others are provided with teachers by the local school
board, and these instructors provide in-house educational services.
Each program must make its own decision about the merits and
liabilities of each type of education. Youth who go to public
school are able to have a more "normal" experience than those who
/I
receive in-house education. On the other hand, in-house education
allows the special needs of 0JS youth to be addressed directly.
In general, it has been NCCD's experience that in-house
education is preferable to public school education. Many if not
most delinquent youth have failed miserably in a traditional school
setting. And many have behavioral problems and learning
disabilities which make instruction in a regular classroom
difficult, both for themselves, the instructor, and their peers.
These difficult problems are often addressed with greater success
in controlled settings, by teachers trained to deal with troubled
youth.
However, some challenges peculiar to Louisiana await programs
which opt for in-house education. Because local parish school
boards must by law provide the teachers used by a program ( this
enables youth to receive Carnegie points for the school work, and
to progress through the education system), it is the locality, and
not the program, which controls education. In many cases, this
arrangement is unsatisfactory. Some teachers are not as skilled as
program staff would wish. Others are unprepared for the behavioral
and emotional troubles of program youth. Yet these problems cannot
be addressed by the program administration. These administrators
may find it frustrating to run in-house education programs over
which they have little control, and to be denied the power to hire
instructors of their own choosing.
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Recommendation:
1. The issue of control over education will become more
important as the state shifts to a community corrections
framework. As such, the OJS should examine the
feasibility of giving programs control over their
education delivery systems. This might require
modifications of the way in which Carnegie units are
distributed. The 0JS should keep in mind that programs
will be able to deliver better education if they are
given the power to modify their education programs as
they see fit.
Level Systems and Behavior Modification
Most programs use a level system to structure client behavior.
The level system appears to play a wide range of roles in programs.
In some, they are central while in others they play a marginal
role. Most seem to have been clearly worked out, and to have been
modified in the light of experience. However, there are no
standards for level systems against which programs are asked to
compare themselves.
The behavior modi'fication systems used in each level system
vary widely. Some involve points, others a token economy, and some
use actual money. But more importantly, there are two oppositional
philosophies of behavior modification, both of which are used by
community-based programs. Some programs emphasize the rewarding of
good behavior. These give youth a positive incentive to cooperate.
Others, however, allot each youth a certain number of points per
I
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week, and deduct points for bad behavior. Here, the emphasis is on
punishment, and is negative; youths have no way of earning points.
Finally, different programs appear to have very different
standards of punishment. Some will pehalize a youth by "dropping
him a level" quite easily, and make advancement very difficult.
Others try hard to help youth advance, and are reluctant to become
overly punitive.
Recommendations:
1. Providers should be given latitude in designing behavior
modification tools. Without latitude, the overall
philosophy of the program may not be expressed in the
level system. However, the state should make clear to
programs that they should seek to develop, in general,
behavior modification models which contain positive
reward structures. Just as bad behavior is punished, so
good behavior should be actively rewarded; client youth
should be given the ability to earn points as well as
lose them.
2. The state should monitor programs' level-dropping rates.
Programs which consistently negate behavioral
accomplishments 6f client youth should be given
assistance in rethinking their level systems so as to
ensure that youth can be reasonably confident that when
they move up a level, they will not be pushed back down
again.
:§
Sex and Drug Education
Some community programs have special counseling services for
drug addicted youth, or for youth who have been abused. Some have
speakers who come every few months. Some have sex education once
a year. Most others address the issue casually, when it comes up
in group discussions.
Recommendation:
1. The state should make sex and drug education a required
aspect of all of its community programs. For youth at
risk, education is the best hope that they will avoid
teenage addiction, pregnancy, and sexually transmitted
diseases. To forgo an opportunity to educate youths when
they are members of a captive audience would be foolish.
Education should occur frequently enough that no youth is
released without education. Further, education should be
conducted by people with experience. It may be too much
to ask each program to institute its own education
program. Perhaps one or two local counselors or teachers
could be hired for the task.
Running Away Problems
Most programs do not have serious run problems. Over the six
month period of July-December, 1990, most programs had one or two
runaways, compared with 7-10 successful program completions, an
acceptable ratio.
However, different programs understand the definition of run
in different ways. Some do not report a run until 24 hours have
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elapsed. Others report runs after two hours. Still others, report
runs within five minutes of detection. The result is misleading
data; some programs appear to be far worse than others.
The state should formally acknowledge that most youth who
leave programs return voluntarily within a few hours. As such,
programs should be required to report "short term AWOLs" as well as
runs.
Recommendations:
1. The state should rewrite its run policy, creating a
category for short term AWOLs, and clearly defining the
conditions to report a runaway.
2. Runs are one of several important indices of how a
program is performing. However, high run rates do not
necessarily indicate programmatic failure. They may
indicate a lack of resources, inadequate staffing levels,
or inappropriate referrals. As such, the state should
monitor run and AWOL rates for programs, and when a
problem emerges, should investigate the problem to locate
the cause(s ) of the runs. The state should then help the
program think through techniques it might use to curb the
problem. Of importance is that the state not encourage
programs to become obsessed with keeping run rates low at
the expense of rehabilitative programs. Techniques short
of locking doors, limiting activities, field trips, and
nights out should be pursued.
§"
Conclusion
Many of the community programs currently in operation in
Louisiana are quite good, and all are capable of improvement. Most
staff seem eager to help youth, and most are open to change. By
implementing further standards and guidelines, creating the Roving
Assistance Teams, and completing the evaluation system, Louisiana's
community programs can function properly and effectively.
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CHAPTER FIVE
:
ORGANIZATIONAL CONCERNS
This chapter examines a series of crucial management and
policy issues which face the OJS. Observations and recommendations
are based on data collected over the course of several days of site
visits to Headquarters and to the New Orleans and the Monroe
Regional Offices. Additional information was gathered from reports
and other documents made available by 0JS staff.
Development of a Comprehensive Case Management System
It has become a truism of basic management that an agency's
mission and purpose should be reflected in its organizational
structure. Louisiana's Office of Juvenile Service's mission is not
adequately reflected in its current structure. Although the OJS
has many dedicated and talented staff, the locus of responsibility
for the management of individual youth's cases is diffuse. The OJS
should work to create a single case management system.
In field offices, the responsibility for direct case work
(probation) and placement resides in two separate administrative .
units. One institutional program, the diagnostic center, reports
to one unit, while the rest of the institutions are overseen by
another unit.
In light of this, the OJS should consider a basic
reorganization of its headquarters office and regional structure
that would facilitate the development of a comprehensive case
management system.
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Recommendation:
Continuous Case Management: In order to ensure that youth
receive services that both protect the public and address
individual needs, the 0JS should consider a continuous case
management system. Committed youth should have one local
worker who has the responsibility for overseeing the delivery
of the appropriate interventions from the initial
classification, assessment, and treatment -- residential and
non-residential -- to re-entry, aftercare and discharge.
To facilitate the development of an improved case management
system, consideration should be given to reorganizing
headquarters' responsibilities within three broad areas:
1. Regional Operations: This unit would have responsibility
for the case management of individual cases, the
development of as complete an array of local services as
possible, and the management of the OJS's relationship
with courts and local communities.
2. Secure Care: This unit would have responsibility for all
secure institutions, public and private. This unit would
ensure that all referrals to institutional services meet
agreed upon criteria. The operational responsibility for
the diagnostic center would be transferred to this unit.
Eventually the 0JS should develop smaller, local,
secure/intensive care units, following the example of
other states which have developed a comprehensive
continuum of services ( e.g. Missouri, Utah, and
Massachusetts ).
The 0JS should seriously consider reducing its funding
commitment to a centralized, institutional diagnostic
unit. In reality almost all of the youth committed to
the diagnostic center are subsequently committed to one
of the Office's institutions. The resources of the
diagnostic center should be used both to upgrade local
diagnostic services so that youth might be more
appropriately matched to alternative local programs and
to improve the quality of services for youth in long term
care.
Similarly, the resources allocated to the short term
offender program at LTI-Bridge City need to be more
carefully used. Given the back-up of committed youth in
secure detention ( approximately 240 youth were on a
"waiting list" as of 9/26/90 ) and the under-utilization
of the short term program, either the admission criteria
for this program need to change or some resources
allocated to this program need to be redirected.
3. Management and Support Services. This unit would have
responsibility for the budget, personnel, federal
reimbursements, the development of new programs,
management information systems, program monitoring and
evaluation, and others.
To the degree possible, management supports such as
budget allocations should be decentralized in order to
support the development of a quality continuum of local
services.
In order to ensure that as complete as possible a
continuum of services is developed throughout the state,
and that a comprehensive system of case management is
developed in each region, the 0JS should consider
organizing its 11 regional offices into 4 larger areas
( for example, the New Orleans area, the North, Central,
and Southwest Areas.) The goal would be to develop a
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'I complete continuum of services within each area.Additionally, this would ensure a continuous casemanagement system for all committed youth that would
include strong aftercare services and supervision
provided the state legislature allocates sufficient
staff.
Of note is that many of these recommendations have been
implemented, to a degree, in the New Orleans region. At the
request of Headquarters, the Regional Office decided to consolidate
the placement unit with the probation service unit. Previously,
the placement unit dealt only with placement while the probation
office provided the services. In the new system, when the court
orders placement, the probation officers have to make the placement
on their own. The intent was to spread out the work load; however,
probation officers who were not familiar with the placement process
suddenly became in charge of tasks they knew little about. This,
in turn, created pressure on them, and led to poorer quality
service. Additional resources should be added to the 0JS staff
development programs to provide training in the topic of
organizational change.
The apparent lesson is that this reform will, at first, meet
with difficulties and some resistance from staff. However, NCCD
believes that despite the complaints about the policy of
consolidating placement with the field services, such an approach
will prove to be superior in the long run, because it will force
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'staff to think about placement closer to the community and also
provide continuity of contact.
Case by Case Oversight on Length of Stay in Residential Programs
At present the 0JS has approximately 700 non-institutional
service intervention slots. Most of these interventions are
contracted group/residential slots. The average length of stay in
these programs is 10 months, longer than many states' length of
stay in training schools. At the present time, 38 percent of these
slots are serving status offenders.
Recommendations:
1. Length of stay guidelines need to be implemented which
ensure that residential interventions are used for more
serious offenders.
Many jurisdictions have reduced their dependence on
residential services by implementing a strong case
management system, agreed upon length-of-stay guidelines,
and the addition of a comprehensive, locally available
system of non-residential services.
2. Regarding status offenders, the 0JS should develop a
community and family focused intervention model for non-
delinquent youth who are in conflict with their families
and school. Such a model might feature a progressive set
of services: six months informal probation supervision,
non-residential crisis intervention, family therapy,
advocacy, educational supports including alternative
schooling, and a short-term small residential program.
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Unless the OJS develops length-of-stay guidelines for all
private residential care and a clear policy regarding
status offenders which limits the type of residential
services and restricts the length of stay for status
offenders in residential care, in all probability, the
proposed expansion of alternative services will not
decrease the Office's use of training schools.
Age Limits for Youth in OJS's Care
Currently the 0JS cares for too many youth over the age of 18.
Since all felony cases after the age of 17 originate in adult
court, the outside limit for youth in the 0JS should be 18 years of
age.
Recommendation:
The OJS should advocate legislation that sets clear age limits
for youth in its care. The only exception to the age limit of
18 should be for youth under 17 who are committed for the most
serious felonies: murder, rape, arson, armed robbery, and
aggravated kidnapping. Youth committed for these offenses
could be maintained under OJS's supervision until their 21st
birthday and could not be discharged before their 21st
birthday without the approval-of the committing court.
By setting a limit on the age a youth can be with the OJS, the
agency will be able to concentrate its resources on developing
quality programs for juvenile offenders, including local
aftercare and re-entry programs.
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The Need for "Performance Measures" for Both Programs and Regions
A juvenile correctional system should consist of a spectrum of
placement options, and should require each program in the spectrum
to define its mission in relation to the total array of options.
As such, programs must be asked to compare themselves to
established standards; there is no other way to ensure that a
proper spectrum of placements exists.
Recommendation:
As new programs continue to be opened, the 0JS needs to
develop a series of "performance measures" that to the degree
possible provide objective information regarding the
performance of individual programs and regions. These
performance indicators could include length-of-stay in
residential care, objective achievement of individual youth's
goals ( e.g. number of youth attaining their GEDs, grade
increases in reading and math, attainment of jobs), and
utilization of secure care. Ideally and eventually, these and
other performance indicators might be included as part of the
OJS's computerized information system.
The 0JS should reassess annually its service continuum and
reallocate resources based on the collective needs of the
youth in each region.
Creation of Secure-Care Bed Quotas for Specific Regions
Local workers all too often see secure care placement as an
unlimited resource, and as the mainstay of the placement spectrum.
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Strong consideration should be given to allocating secure care
beds to specific geographic regions or areas. Although it
might take an extended period of time to develop a
decentralized secure care system, the present institutional
beds, including the short term STOP program, could be
allocated to a specific set of regional offices. Doing this
would help ensure that local workers began to see secure care
as a scarce resource and only as part of the continuum of
services that are available to help manage their caseloads.
Out of sight would not, therefore, be out of mind. In
addition, institutional workers would have a limited number of
community (aftercare) workers with whom to relate. For those
youth in need of secure care, re-entry planning could begin
with a youth's first day in institutional care. The OJS
eventually would work to decentralize the location of its
secure care programs.
Conclusion
The leadership of the Office of Juvenile Services has a unique
opportunity. In large measure, with additional resources, the
reform promised by the merger of institutional and field services
can be more fully achieved. Although final outcomes cannot be
ultimately controlled or guaranteed, the recommendations outlined
in this chapter are offered in the hope that they might help
Louisiana better perform its ongoing responsibility to manage a
changing and improving juvenile justice system.
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CRITICAL NEXT STEPS
Louisiana is at the crossroads in its juvenile correctional
system. One road leads to continued federal court supervision and
repeated short-term fixes to system-wide problems. The other road
leads to a new paradigm of juvenile justice that promises to
advance both public safety and the "best interests of the child".
This report has suggested a variety of approaches Louisiana
might take in pursuing the latter· road. In making these
recommendations, NCCD has drawn heavily on the experiences of other
states, such as Massachusetts, Utah and Missouri, which have
successfully traveled this path.
These recommendations have covered three basic areas: the use
of secure placement, the structure of the community placement
system, and the statutes, policies, and organization applicable to
the Office of Juvenile Services. The report's major
recommendations are summarized below.
Secure Placements: Policy Options
The state is faced with three distinct strategies to reduce
the LTI population.
NCCD's preferred recommendation is that the 0JS implement a
new public safety-oriented risk assessment instrument. With the
classification instrum8nt described in Chapter Three OJS could
bring its secure bed needs to 439. To be prudent, the state might
want to operate up to 500 beds; this represents a 50% reduction
I"
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over current secure placements. This is clearly the most cost-
effective option consistent with public safety considerations.
A second, more modest strategy, would involve a series of
minor policy changes. These would include:
a. Diverting the lowest severity offenders from secure
care.
b. Limiting the secure confinement of drug offenders
to 12 months.
C. Paroling all property offenders 6-9 months prior to
the expiration of their sentences. Savings: 72
beds.
d. Reassigning all offenders to community placements
6-9 months prior to their maximum sentence.
Savings: 94 beds.
e. Making the maximum sentence up to age 18 for all
but the highest severity offenses. Savings: 138
beds.
f. Reassigning to non-secure programs offenders within
15 days. This will help 0JS exert greater control
over its community programs.
The cumulative savings from these minor policy changes would
be 300-369 beds.
The third and most costly option open to the state would be to
build additional secure care facilities. To deal with a 7.5
percent increase of the secure care population by 1995, and to
accommodate all youth on the waiting list for secure care
evaluation, the 0JS could expand the secure bed inventory by 300
beds, at an estimated cost of $33 million.
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Community Programming: Creating a Continuum of Care
There are a variety of steps 0JS should take to strengthen its
community programming, and to ensure that community programming is
as effective as it can be.
9 1. 0JS should create a "continuum of care" model, against
which existing programs are matched. 0JS can, in this
way, determine where the gaps in its non-secure
programming exist, and can pursue the creation of
programs to fill those gaps.
2. 0JS should establish a Roving Assistance Team to monitor
programs in-depth and on a full time basis. The team
would stay at and observe each program for a week at a
time, twice a year. This will help 0JS exert greater
control over its community programs.
3. A follow-up aftercare system should be established by the
state, in which youth are monitored for a year after
release, and in which numerous aftercare programs are
made available to the vast majority of community care
graduates.
4. 0JS should examine the feasibility of legislation to give
community programs more control over their education
delivery systems, including the power to hire and retain
teachers.
5. 0JS should establish standards for counseling programs,
and should rank programs according to the intensity and
quality of counseling.
6. The state should make sex and drug education a required
aspect of all of its community programs.
7. The state should adopt a behavior management model which
stresses rewards as well as punishments. This would
shorten stays at LTIs and community programs.
8. The state should restructure its run-away policy.
organizational Concerns
The 0JS should take several steps to make the administration
of the Office of Juvenile Services and the state's juvenile justice
system more effective.
1. The 0JS should advocate legislation that sets clear age
limits for youth in its care; the age limit should be 18,
with the exception of the most serious offenders.
2. As new community-based programs continue to be opened,
the 0JS should develop a series of performance measures
which provide objective information regarding the
performance of individual programs and regions. These
performance indicators should include length of stay in
residential care, objective achievement of the individual
youth's goals, and utilization of secure care evaluation
and placement.
3. Strong consideration should be given to allocating secure
care beds to specific geographic regions or areas. A
decentralized secure care system, in which a certain
number of placements would be allocated to each regional
office, would encourage responsible placement decision
making.
4. Length of stay guidelines need to be implemented which
ensure that residential interventions are used for
serious offenders only.
5. The 0JS should continue to expand its single case
management system.
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